Sentencing in Courts - Tanzania
UNIVERSITY OF DAR ES SALAAM SCHOOL OF LAW
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC LAW
MR. JABA SHADRACK, Assistant Lecturer in Law
A. Introduction: Sentencing
Etymologically,
the word “sentence” or its derivative
“sentencing” comes from a Latin word,
“sententia” used in Roman & civil
law, which simply means “a judicial
decision”.
Therefore,
the term “sentencing” can be defined
as a post-conviction stage in a criminal trial where a judge or a magistrate is
required to determine or assess or evaluate a legal sanction(s), and actually
impose the same on a person found guilty of an offence. In other words, sentencing
can be said to mean a way courts deal with a person after he has pleaded guilty
or has been found guilty in a criminal trial/ proceeding. In
Tanzania, a criminal trial may either be a summary trials or trials on
indictment. In certain cases (especially Murder), trial on indictment is
preceded by committal proceedings taking place in the Resident or District
Magistrates’ Court.
Summary:
The Black’s Law Dictionary, 2009
Sentencing
is the judicial determination of the penalty for a crime.
The Criminal Procedure Act (Cap. 20)[1]
In
Tanzania, after a conviction the trial magistrate or judge gives a judgement
followed by a sentence. Where an accused person has pleaded guilty, judgement
will usually not be passed and the judge will move immediately to sentence the
offender.
B. Sources of Sentencing Powers/Law, Principles
and Guidance
·
The
Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania (1977)
Articles
4(1)(2) and 107A(1)(2), & 107B vests adjudicative powers (which include
sentencing) in Judicial (courts) and Quasi-Judicial (tribunals) bodies. Read
also, Article 13(1)-(6), 15(1)(2), 17(1)(2), 25(3) and 67(7) of the
Constitution.
·
Legislation
Statutes
passed by the parliament establish the framework of Tanzania sentencing law, e.g. the Penal Code, Cap. 16, the Law of
the Child Act (2009)[2], the
National Defence Act (RE 2002)[3], the
Ward Tribunal Act (RE 2002), the Criminal Procedure Act, supra, the Magistrates’ Courts Act (RE 2002), the Appellate
Jurisdiction Act (RE 2002), the Tanzania Court of Appeal Rules (2009), the
Minimum Sentences Act (1972, Cap. 90)[4], the
Interpretation of Laws Act (2002)[5],
the Tax Revenue Appeals Act (RE 2006)[6], and
etc. Basically, statutes set minimum and maximum sentences for almost every
offence.
·
Decisions
of Courts of Records (especially, the High Court of Tanzania and
the Court of Appeal of Tanzania).
Generally,
sentencing decisions are made by sentencers (i.e. magistrates, judge and etc.) guided by the penal law, and decisions
of other judges at the same or lower court levels.
·
The Common
Law and Doctrines of Equity
E.g. The principle of Totality in sentencing (a
common law doctrine derived from English and Welsh law).
Read: Judicature and
Application of Laws Act, Cap. 358.
Refer: Statute of the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (Adopted by Security Council resolution 955 (1994) of 8
November 1994 amended by Security Council resolutions 1165 (1998) of 30 April
1998, 1329 (2000) of 30 November 2000, 1411 (2002) of 17 May 2002 and 1431
(2002) of 14 August 2002); Statute of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 25 May 1993; and
the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (signed on 17 July 1998, and
came into force on 1st July 2002).
C. Classification of Sentencing
The sentencing process can be classified as follows:-
i)
According
to the length/duration of punishment
·
Determinate
vis-à-vis Indeterminate/indefinite/Discretionary Sentencing
Determinate
sentencing involves a sentence to confinement for a fixed or minimum period
that is specified by statute, while indeterminate/indefinite sentencing
involves a term of imprisonment with no definite/specific period of time or
release date within a prescribed maximum. Indefinite sentencing is common for
juvenile offenders. It is left up to the court, with few or very flexible
guidelines. At the time of the imposition of the penalty, it may involve
sentence or plea bargain.
ii)
According
to the form of punishment
·
Custodial vis-à-vis
Non-custodial Sentencing
Custodial sentencing entails imposing a
punishment (and hence the resulting punishment itself) consisting of mandatory
custody of the convict, either in prison (incarceration) or in some other
closed therapeutic and/or educational institution. On the other hand, non-custodial sentencing means
any decision made by a competent authority to submit a person suspected of,
accused of or sentenced for an offence to certain conditions and obligations
that do not include imprisonment; such decision can be made at any stage of the
administration of criminal justice [Tokyo
Rules: Rule 2.1].
iii)
According
to how the sentence is served
·
Concurrent
vis-à-vis Consecutive/Cumulative sentencing[8]
Concurrent sentencing occurs where a criminal
defendant is convicted of two or more crimes, a judge/magistrate sentences the
defendant to a certain period of time for each crime, but all sentences will be
served at the same time, with the longest period controlling others. Judges may
sentence concurrently out of compassion, plea bargaining, or the fact that such
several crimes are interrelated. Therefore, when sentences run concurrently,
defendants serve all the sentences at the same time. While, consecutive/cumulative
sentencing requires a defendant to finish serving the sentence for one offense
before they start serving the sentence for any other offense, i.e. one custodial sentence will start
after the other one has finished. A consecutive/cumulative sentences will not
generally be imposed where matters of fact arise out of the same incident.
iv)
According
to the Ranges on Sentence
·
Mandatory/compulsory/Minimum
vis-à-vis Maximum sentencing
Mandatory/Minimum sentencing means a
statutorily specified penalty that automatically follows a conviction for the
offense, often with a minimum mandatory term. It is a type of sentencing in
which a judge must give a set sentence (i.e.
the lowest amount of punishment a person must receive), e.g. the Minimum Sentences
Act, supra. While, under maximum sentencing is the highest amount of
punishment a person can receive[9], e.g. Capital punishment for Murder.[10]
D. Why Sentencing? Purpose of sentencing
Any court or tribunal dealing with an offender in respect of his/her offence must have regard to the following purposes of sentencing;
Any court or tribunal dealing with an offender in respect of his/her offence must have regard to the following purposes of sentencing;
- a) Punishment of offenders
- b) Reduction of crimes, including its reduction by deterrence
- c) Reform and rehabilitation of offenders
- d) Protection of the public
- e) To denounce, condemn, or censure the type of conduct engaged in by the offender
- f) Making of reparation by offenders to persons affected by their offences
NB: Modern sentencing
policy reflects a combination of several or all of these elements.
E. Sentencing Approaches and Principles
Sentencing
principles have developed through legislation and court decisions (common law)
to form the basis of sentencing decisions. Generally, there are two basic
approaches of sentencing, namely;
(i)
Traditional/Discretionary
Approach
The
traditional approach to sentencing requires the sentencer to exercise his or
her discretion in order to determine an appropriate sentence. The sentence
should be neither too lenient nor too severe. The guiding principles are
judge-made, which consists of three
basic elements in the construction of any sentence, i.e., (1) the seriousness of the crime; (2) the offender’s personal
circumstances; and (3) the wider interests of society.
(ii)
Contemporary/Minimum
sentences Approach
Legislation
are made to introduce or prescribing minimum sentences for a wide range of the
more serious crimes, e.g. the Minimum
Sentences Act, supra, Tanzania. In
other jurisdictions, especially the UK and Canada, have special guidelines or
codes on sentencing.
Nonetheless,
whether the sentencer is bound to follow traditional or contemporary approach,
there are several key principles that he/she has to adhere to at sentencing, as
follows:-
i)
Principle
of Proportionality
This
principle requires a punishment to fit the crime. It operates to restrain
excessive, arbitrary and capricious punishment by requiring that punishment
must not exceed the gravity of the offence, even where it seems certain that
the offender will immediately re-offend.
Theories
of deterrence and retribution share the idea that punishments should be
proportionate to the gravity of the crime, a principle of practical importance.
If all punishments were the same, there would be no incentive to commit the
lesser rather than the greater offence. The offender might as well use violence
against the victim of a theft if the penalty for armed robbery were no more.
Therefore, the overall punishment must be proportionate to the gravity of the
offending behaviour.[11]
The proportionality principle can be divided into two major groups, i.e.
(a) Principle of Totality
It comes
into play where there is a sentence for multiple offences, especially in
consecutive/cumulative sentencing.[12]
The principle requires the court to craft an inclusive sentence of all offences
that is not excessive. If the total sentence is excessive the court must adjust
the sentence so that the total sentence is proper. The totality principle was
intended to avoid sentences that cumulatively are out of proportion to the
gravity of the offences. Dr. David A. Thomas[13]
says that;
“When cases of multiplicity of offences come
before the court, the court must not content itself by doing the arithmetic and
passing the sentence which the arithmetic produces. It must look at the
totality of the criminal behaviour and ask itself what is the appropriate
sentence for all the offences.”
(b) Principle of Parsimony/Restraint in Sentencing
The
parsimony principle operates to prevent the imposition of a sentence that is
more severe than that necessary to achieve the purpose(s) of the sentence. Adams J in DB v Regina; DNN v Regina
[2007] NSWCCA 27 defined the
parsimony principle to mean an imposition of the minimum sentence that reflects
the objective and subjective features of a case and satisfies the purposes of
sentencing or the adoption of a sentence at the bottom of the range.[14] Under
this principle, a sentence must be no more severe than is necessary to meet the
purposes of sentencing, e.g.,
protection of the public. This is a rule against torture.
Napier C.J. in Webb v O'Sullivan (1952) SASR 65 at 66
says;
“The courts should endeavour to make the
punishment fit the crime and the circumstances of the offender, as nearly as
may be. Our first concern is the
protection of the public, but, subject to that, the court should lean towards
mercy. We ought not to award the maximum which the offence will warrant, but
rather the minimum which is consistent with a due regard for the public interest.”
Basically,
there are two school of thought with regard to the principle of parsimony. One
maintains that parsimony should be pursued at a general level, by reducing
overall levels of severity (system
parsimony). The other maintains that opportunities for parsimony should be
taken as and when they arise, and irrespective of whether this compromises any
other value or principle (opportunist
parsimony). Opportunists would therefore support the reduction of sentences
for people in employment and people who pay compensation to their victims, and
in a range of other cases which contravene the equality principle.
In brief,
the principle of parsimony is based on the principle
of liberty, that is to say, an offender should not be deprived of liberty,
if a less restrictive way of dealing with the case is appropriate in the
circumstances, e.g. payment of a
fine.
ii)
Step-up
Principle
The
step-up principle is a sentencing principle closely associated with the principle
of rehabilitation. It rests on a desire not to discourage genuine efforts at
rehabilitation by imposing a sentence that “may
be seen by [the offender] to be a dead weight on his future life.”[15]
Thus, where there is a prospect of rehabilitation, a sentence should not be too
large a step-up from a prior sentence.[16] Nonetheless,
the step-up principle can be invoked where an offender is convicted of a
similar or identical offence to one he has been convicted and sentenced in the
past for, it can be concluded that the prior sentence was not sufficiently
deterrent and so the sentence for the new offence should be increased to focus
on specific deterrence.
iii)
Principle
of Equality or Non-discrimination
Human
rights instruments and constitutional documents commonly enact a principle of
equality or non-discrimination. One of the common passage is:
“Every person is equal before the law and is
entitled to the equal protection of the law without discrimination and has the
right to equal and effective protection against discrimination.”
Equality
before the law requires that persons should be uniformly treated, unless there
is some valid reason to treat them differently. In its application to
sentencing, the general principle of equality before the law means that no
person should be sentenced differently because of their race, national or
ethnic origin, religion, gender, sexual orientation, mental or physical
disability or similar characteristics.
In sentencing,
the equality principle may be invoked under two wider principles, i.e.
( a) Principle of Parity/Consistency
A sentence
should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar
offences committed in similar circumstances. Parity/consistency in sentencing
is regarded as fundamental to a fair and equitable criminal justice system and
ensures that two offenders who have committed similar crimes and have similar
personal circumstances are going to receive a similar sentence. A judge has a
responsibility to impose sentences in line with precedent, noting always that
for each offence and each offender some elements are unique. Therefore, similar
sentences should be imposed for similar offences committed by offenders in
similar circumstances. However, in a situation of co-accused, the roles of the
parties will be considered as well as their personal circumstances. The
principle of parity does not require equal sentences for participants in the same
offence. Rather, they must only [be] understandable sentences when examined
together. Where accomplices who commit the crime at the orders of a principal
and agree to testify against the principal can be afforded lesser sentences
than the principal.
( b) Equal Impact Principle
The
principle of equal impact also derives from the general principle of equality,
but is separate from the principle of equality in its non-discrimination sense.
The principle of equal impact was recognised by Bentham, who, despite his emphasis on general deterrence, argued
for a rule which takes into account individual sensibilities in calculating
punishment. The equal impact aspect of the general principle means that no
sentence should be imposed that may be expected to have a more severe impact on
an offender because of the offender’s race, religion, national or ethnic origin
and so on.
iv)
Jump
Principle
This
principle of sentencing suggests that sentences for repeat offenders should
increase gradually, rather than by large leaps. In R. v. Robitaille (1993), 31 B.C.A.C. 7, Lambert J.A. indicated that
it should be used only in cases where rehabilitation is a significant
sentencing factor. An obvious example is
where the offender is a young person who has committed very few offences. Clayton Ruby, Sentencing, 6th
ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 2004), p. 339, opines that,
“Even when there is a marked increase in the
seriousness of the crime committed, there should not be too great a ‘jump’ in
the length of the sentence imposed.”
Read: R. v. Johnsrud, 2014 ABCA 395.
v)
Gap
Principle
This
principle direct courts to take into consideration the gaps of time between
offences. It gives credit to someone who has made an effort to avoid criminal
charges.
Read: R. v. Smith, 2006 NSCA 95.
vi)
Concept of
Mercy/Clemency/Lenity
In the
context of punishment, mercy entails a discretionary power of a judge to reduce
or eliminate a just punishment or impose a lenient sanction.
For
instance, in R. v. Schumann (2007) a
woman who jumped off the Humber Bridge holding her small child, intending to
commit suicide and to kill the child. She survived, and also managed to keep
the child a float and alive until rescuers reached them. Her crime was attempted
murder and the guideline indicated a high sentence, but the judge took account
of her mental disturbance and her efforts to save the child in passing a short
custodial sentence, and the Court of Appeal out of ‘mercy’ substituted a community sentence. This is a case where
compassion for the offender was appropriate, and therefore a mitigated sentence
based on mercy was in order.
vii)
Principles
of natural justice/ Due process of the law
Concern
procedural fairness and ensure a fair decision is reached by an objective
decision maker. Right to be heard, duty to give reasons for the
decision/pronouncing sentence and giving reasons (by the sentencer), and duty
to explain rights of the parties to the proceedings (by the sentencer), e.g. appeal. Sentencers have
always been encouraged wherever possible to give full reasons for deciding upon
a particular sentence. There are now a large number of statutory provisions
requiring the court to explain why a particular sentence has been passed (or
not passed) or why a particular approach to sentence has been taken.
viii)
Rule
against Double Punishment
This
principle requires the sentencers not to punish the offender twice for the same
offence (i.e. rule against double
vexation).
ix)
Principle
of Jurisdiction
The
sentencing court has to ensure that it has power to pass the sentence. For
instance, in Tanzania, it is only the High Court and Court of Appeal which can
impose a death penalty.
F. Sentencing factors
By
definition, these may be said to mean factors that appear to influence
sentencing courts, classed as aggravating or mitigating as follows;
This
principle is premised on the seriousness of the alleged offence. Initial factor
in determining seriousness of the offence, involves four (4) levels of
culpability, i.e.
·
Intention
to cause harm: highest culpability where offence planned, the worse the
harm intended the greater the seriousness.
·
Recklessness
as to whether harm is caused: proceeds giving no thought to obvious risk
of harm
·
Knowledge
of specific risks entailed by actions, but does not intend to cause the harm
resulting
·
Negligence
Culpability increased: if defendant deliberately causes more harm
than necessary for the commission of the offence, or defendant targets a victim
who is vulnerable (i.e. by youth, old
age or due to job).
Essentially, aggravating
factors mean factors indicating higher culpability. They includes:-
Offence
committed whilst on bail for other offences; Failure to respond to
previous
sentences Offence was racially or religiously aggravated; Offence
motivated by,
or demonstrating, hostility to the victim based on his or her sexual
orientation (or presumed sexual orientation); Offence motivated by, or
demonstrating, hostility based on the victim’s disability (or presumed
disability); Previous conviction(s), particularly where a pattern of
repeat
offending is disclosed; Planning of an offence; An intention to commit
more
serious harm than actually resulted from the offence; Offenders
operating in
groups or gangs; ‘Professional’ offending; Commission of the offence for
financial gain (where this is not inherent in the offence itself); High
level
of profit from the offence; An attempt to conceal or dispose of
evidence;
Failure to respond to warnings or concerns expressed by others about the
offender’s behaviour; Offence committed whilst on licence; Offence
motivated by hostility towards a minority group, or a member or
members of
such a group; Deliberate targeting of vulnerable victim(s); Commission
of an
offence while under the influence of alcohol or drugs; Use of a weapon
to
frighten or injure victim; Deliberate
and gratuitous violence or damage to property, over and above what is
needed to
carry out the offence; Abuse of power; Abuse of a position of trust;
Multiple victims; An especially serious
physical or psychological effect on the victim, even if unintended; A
sustained
assault or repeated assaults on the same victim; Victim is particularly
vulnerable; Location of the offence (for example, in an isolated place);
Offence is committed against those working in the public sector or
providing a
service to the public; Presence of others (e.g.
relatives, especially children or partner of the victim); Additional
degradation of the victim (e.g.
taking photographs of a victim as part of a sexual offence); In property
offences, high value (including sentimental value) of property to the victim,
or substantial consequential loss (e.g.
where the theft of equipment causes serious disruption to a victim’s life or
business).
NB: Aggravating factors increase the seriousness of the offence or the offender's culpability. In terms of proof, the general rule in the Commonwealth is that aggravating facts must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, mirroring the trial standard.
ii)
Mitigating
factors
The law
allows courts to reduce a sentence if a person pleads guilty. If the court gives
a discount for a plea of guilty, the judge or magistrate must state what the
sentence would have been without the guilty plea. The issue of
remorse/contrition should be taken into account at this point along with other
mitigating features such as admissions to the police in interview, degree of
provocation, self-defense, guilty plea, and etc. Basically, mitigating factors reduce the seriousness of the offence or the
offender’s culpability. The Common Law/English sentencing practice yields at
least six (6) possible classes or groups of mitigating factors that have no
bearing on proportionality. These are:-
a)
Positive
social contributions/ meritorious conduct/positive character/ clean
criminal record
This group of potential mitigating factors includes cases in which an offender has saved another person from drowning while awaiting trial, or has done considerable voluntary service for the community. In the case of Jones [2012] 1 Cr App R (S) 149, where sentence was slashed on appeal from five years to six months, the personal mitigation included the fact that the twenty-two-year-old offender had worked in a youth parliament, had represented young people in her area, had been instrumental in opening youth clubs in the area, and was described as an outstanding conscientious student who was about to graduate from university. She had also dedicated herself to the care of her older sister with Down’s syndrome. The Court of Appeal said that ‘if ever there was a case of exceptional circumstances, this is it’.
b)
Pursuit of
equality policies
Sentencing law and practice incorporate various factors that stem from wider social policies. For example, the practice of aggravating a sentence where an offence has been motivated by race, religion, or discrimination on grounds of disability or sexual orientation. More relevant are the differential effect of sentences on women and the significance of employment. It is widely accepted that imprisonment has a greater effect on women generally, partly because women’s prisons are widely scattered and therefore further from their homes, partly because female prisoners can less frequently call on others to look after their family and home, partly because they have a higher rate of self-harming, and so on.
c)
Severe
collateral /consequential effects of conviction and sentence on the offender
This group includes other deprivations resulting from the conviction, such as loss of pension rights and employment prospects; any adverse physical consequences of the offence, such as an injury sustained by the offender; effects flowing from a long delay in prosecution, such as when a person has led a blameless life for many years. in Sweden factors of this kind are rationalised as ‘natural punishment’: the burglar who is injured while committing the offence has inflicted some ‘punishment’ on himself, and therefore requires less state punishment, and the same might be said of the fraudulent accountant who loses his career and his pension rights or a thief who has been mobbed and punished extra-judicially.
d)
Severe collateral
or consequential effects of the sentence on third parties
This group of potential mitigating factors includes the effect on a baby or young child of its mother being in prison, the effect on a sick relative of the offender being in prison, and the effect on employees of their employer being in prison.
e)
Incentives
to facilitate the smooth running of the criminal justice system
A reduction in sentence for pleading guilty (guilty plea) now forms part of many legal systems. For instance, sentence reductions for assisting the police or prosecution by giving evidence against other offenders. Admissions to police in interview, ready cooperation with authorities (assisting the police in indicting other criminals).
NB: In England, the
reduction principle is not ‘an aspect of
mitigation’ but an administrative discount for pleading guilty based on the
cost savings in the case, the benefit of allowing other cases to be tried more
expeditiously and the benefit to victims and witnesses of knowing that they will
not need to give evidence.
f)
Reparation,
genuine remorse and other post-offence matters
The general rule is that events occurring after the crime are not relevant to sentence. However, some ‘best fit’ reasoning may be found in evidence that members of the public are more sympathetic towards offenders who apologise or otherwise show remorse, and that we should recognise the value of an offender publicly denouncing his or her own offending behaviour. Such a public self-denunciation should be rewarded in the only coinage available, reduction of sentence.
Summary of Personal Mitigating Factors:
youth, pressing personal or family needs, vulnerable/immature/naive,
psychiatric illness/problems, provocation, good character or
limited/irrelevant/gap in previous offending, has led a productive/worthwhile
life, has shown a general improvement in behaviour, offence uncharacteristic/let
yourself down’, difficult/deprived background and, in relation to the defendant’s
present and future, can address/is addressing drug problems, has family
responsibilities, supportive family/partner, currently in work/training or
prospects of work/training (the offender’s educational and vocational skills),
can address/is addressing alcohol problems, lapse of time since commission of
the offence, can or may make amends for offending behaviour, age (older), cultural
demands, ignorance of the law, reasonable man test, offender’s physique, and physical
illness/disability.
NB: the burden of proof in
respect of mitigating factors, is on preponderance or balance of probabilities’
standard.
Cases:[18]
Lucas
John v. R., Criminal
Appeal No. 8 of 2002, in the Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Mwanza
(Judgment delivered on the 16th day of July, 2004 by Lubuva, J.A., Mroso, J.A., and
Kaji, J.A.).
Rweyemamu
Thomas @ Kaningili Muzahura v. R., Criminal Appeal No. 370 of 2008, in the
Court of Appeal of Tanzania at Mwanza (Judgment delivered on the 10th
day of November, 2011 by Munuo, J.A., Nsekela, J.A and Mandia, J.A.).
Kisukari
Mmemo v. R., Criminal
Appeal No.192 of 2013, in the Court of Appeal of
Tanzania at Dodoma (Judgment delivered on the 11th day of August,
2014 by Hon. Luanda, J.A., Massati, l.A., and Mussa, J.A.).
Summary: Sentencing principles/guidelines
The sentencer has to consider the:- need to
promote consistency in sentencing; impact of sentencing decisions on victims of
offences; need to promote public confidence in the criminal justice system; cost
of different sentences; relative effectiveness of different sentences in
preventing re-offending; and court must impose a sentence within the range
provided for the offence in the penal laws.
G. Juvenile Delinquent: Sentencing factors and thresholds
For young
offenders, rehabilitation is the principal consideration in sentencing.
Notably, considerations that must be taken into account when sentencing a young
offender includes:
·
the need to strengthen and preserve the
relationship between the child and the child’s family
·
the desirability of allowing the child to
live at home
·
the desirability of allowing the education,
training, or employment of the child to continue without interruption or
disturbance
·
the need to minimise the stigma to the child
resulting from a court determination
·
the suitability of the sentence to the child
·
if appropriate, ensuring the child is aware
of the need to take responsibility for any action that is against the law
·
if appropriate, the need to protect the
community, or any person, from the violent or other wrongful acts of the child.
NB: In the context of
Tanzania, both national and international laws prohibit
incarnation/imprisonment of young offenders, and mixing them with adult
offender in detention facilities.
QUIZZES
1.
What are the stages or
processes involved in a criminal trial?
2.
Are there justifications in our
penal laws and policies for altering the otherwise appropriate sentence?
Discuss using case laws, hypothetical cases and penal laws in Tanzania.
3.
“Courts should not have discretion to decide whether or not to reduce or
impose a sentence” (Anonymous). Discuss
the above quotation by showing the discretionary effect of mitigating and
aggravating factors in sentencing.
4.
What are the differences and
similarities between Criminal defences and Mitigating factors in sentencing?
5.
What is the nexus between
aggravating factors and Mitigating factors?
6.
What do we mean by
sentencing factors?
7.
What is the standard of
proof of aggravating and mitigating facts at sentencing?
8.
Is there any difference
between sentencing in Adult Court and Juvenile Court in Tanzania? If “yes”, list and examine the role of the victim’s
personal statement, pre-sentencing records and reports from relevant
authorities at sentencing an adult or a juvenile.
9.
What is the effect of a
failure by the court to give reason(s) for the sentence pronounced?
10. Is
there any formal sentencing guidelines or code for Judges and Magistrates in
Tanzania?
11. What
are the likely effects of a criminal sentence to an offender and the society?
REFERENCES
·
Books/Articles
Ashworth,
A. (2010) Sentencing and Criminal Justice: Law in Context. Cambridge
University Press, London.
Ashworth,
A. & Wasik, M. (1998) Fundamentals of Sentencing Theory: Essays in
Honour of Andrew von Hirsch. Oxford Monographs on Criminal Law and Justice,
Oxford University Press.
Bagaric,
M. (2001) Punishment and Sentencing: A Rational Approach. Cavendish Publishing Limited, London &
Sydney.
Champion,
D.J. (2008) Sentencing: A Reference Book. ABC-CLIO, Inc., California.
Meyer,
L.R. (2010) The Justice of Mercy. The University of Michigan Press.
Roberts,
J.V. (2011) Mitigation and Aggravation at Sentencing. Cambridge
University Press, London.
Sarat,
A. (2011) Merciful Judgments and Contemporary Society: Legal Problems, Legal
Possibilities. Cambridge University Press.
Wasik,
M. (2014) A Practical Approach to Sentencing, 5th Ed. Oxford
University Press, London.
Williams,
D. (1974) the Minimum Sentences Act,
1972, of Tanzania. Journal of African Law, Vol. 18, No. 1, Criminal
Law and Criminology (spring), Cambridge University Press, pp. 79-91.
·
Guidelines, Rules and
Standards
International:
Basic
Principles for Treatment of Prisoners, G.A. Res. 45/111, annex, U.N. Doc.
A/45/49 (Dec. 12, 1990).
Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, United Nations Secretariat,
Report of Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the
Treatment of Offenders, Milan, Italy (Aug. 26-Sept. 6, 1985), Ch. I, §D.2,
annex.
Basic
Principles on the Role of Lawyers, United Nations Secretariat, Report of Eighth
United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders, Havana, Cuba (Aug. 27-Sept. 7, 1990) , Ch. I, §B.3, annex.
Basic
Principles on the use of Restorative Justice Programmes in Criminal Matters,
E.S.C. Res. 2002/12, annex (July 24, 2002).
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Imprisonment, G.A. Res. 43/173, U.N. Doc. A/RES/43/173 (Dec. 9, 1988).
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of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials, G.A. Res. 34/169, annex, U.N. Doc.
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2(b).
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Cases:
Salum
Shabani v. R. [1985] TLR 71.
Rashid
Ramadhani v. R. (1968) HCD No. 323.
Manyanga
v. R. (1970) HCD No. 284.
Mbaruku
Ndima v. R. (1967) HCD No. 212.
Nguruwe
v. R. [1981] TLR 66.
Mwizalubi
Matisho v. R. (1970) HCD No. 296.
R.
v. Albert Mwendenuka (1969) HCD No. 48.
Sajile
Salemu v. R. [1964] E.A 341.
Lawrence
Amuli v. R. (1970) HCD No. 72.
Joseph
Hawksworth & Another v. R. (1970) HCD No. 271.
R.
v. Oswald Bruno Kanga (1970) HCD No. 153.
R.
v. Joha Mdachi (1967) HCD No. 355.
Lucas
v. R. (1970) HCD No. 298.
R.
v. Semberit Magnus Kassembere (1967) HCD No. 95.
F.
Chilemba v. R. (1968) HCD No. 510.
Lubaga
Senga v. R. [1992] TLR 357.
Bernadeta
Paul v. R. [1992] TLR 97.
R.
v. Gaudenzio Kiwhele & Another 1 TLR (R) 81.
R.
v. Selemani Said & Another 1977 L.R.T N. 29.
Gulam
Hussein v. R. 13 E.A.C.A 167.
Rashidi
s/o Ally v. R. (1967) HCD No. 215.
R.
v. Kisiwani Sisal Estate (1970) HCD No. 162.
R.
v. Alli s/o Said (1967) HCD No. 364.
End notes:
[1] Refer, sections 166, 170, 311,
314, 320 and 321.
[2] Juvenile Court
[3] Court-martial and
Court-martial Appeal Court
[4] Read sections 4, 5, 6, 8,
and 11.
[5] Sections 68, 71, 73, and
74.
[6] Tax Appeal Tribunal
[7] See, references
[8] Elias Joakim v. R. (1992) TLR 220, R. v. Kasongo s/o Luhogwa 2 TLR (R)
47, Musa s/o Bakari v. R. (1968) HCD No. 239, Elias Joakim v. R. [1992] TLR
220, Chilemba v. R. [1969] E.A 470, R. v. Paul Msilu (1968) HCD No. 64.
Read also, Section 36 of the Penal Code, and Section 168 of the Criminal
Procedure Act.
[9] Refer, Section 170 of the
Criminal Procedure Act.
[10] Sections 25 & 26 of
the Penal Code
[11] Read, Ally and Another v. R. (1972) HCD No.115.
[12] The Totality principle
requires that where an offender is being sentenced to multiple terms at the
same time, then the sentencer should ensure that the total sentence remains ‘just and appropriate/proportionate’ for
the whole of the offending, reflecting the overall seriousness of the
criminality.
[13] (1970) Principles of
sentencing: The sentencing policy of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division.
[14] Refer also; Napier CJ in Webb v. O'Sullivan (1952) SASR 65 at 66; Veen v. The Queen [No.2]
(1988) 164-465 at 473); R. v. Storey (1996) [1998] 1 VR 359 at 366; and R v. PP
(2003) 142 A Crim R 369 at 374 (Parsimonious sentences).
[15] R. v. Robitaille, (1993) 31 B.C.A.C. 7, [1993] B.C.J. No. 1404 at para.
8.
[16] Extracted in the case of R. v.
Kukelka, 2010 BCCA 180 (Court of Appeal for British Columbia).
[17] Read, Sections 321, 337, 341
and 342 of the Criminal Procedure Act.
[18] Available online.
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